The notion of security for probabilistic cryptosystems

Authors:
Silvio Micali;Charles Rackoff;Bob Sloan
Affiliations:
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge;Univ. of Toronto, Toronto, Ont., Canada;Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge
Venue:
Proceedings on Advances in cryptology---CRYPTO '86
Year:
1987

Citing 3
Cited 3

Real and complex analysis, 3rd ed.

Real and complex analysis, 3rd ed.
Theory and application of trapdoor functions

SFCS '82 Proceedings of the 23rd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Verifiable secret sharing and achieving simultaneity in the presence of faults

SFCS '85 Proceedings of the 26th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science

A new probabilistic encryption scheme

Lecture Notes in Computer Science on Advances in Cryptology-EUROCRYPT'88
Direct Minimum-Knowledge Computations

CRYPTO '87 A Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques on Advances in Cryptology
Randomness Re-use in Multi-recipient Encryption Schemeas

PKC '03 Proceedings of the 6th International Workshop on Theory and Practice in Public Key Cryptography: Public Key Cryptography

Quantified Score

Hi-index	0.00

Visualization

Abstract

Three very different formal definitions of security for public-key cryptosystems have been proposed--two by Goldwasser and Micali and one by Yao. We prove all of them to be equivalent. This equivalence provides evidence that the right formalization of the notion of security has been reached.