Sequential Auctions for the Allocation of Resources with Complementarities
IJCAI '99 Proceedings of the Sixteenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Strategic sequential bidding in auctions using dynamic programming
Proceedings of the first international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems: part 2
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In this paper, we develop a new method for finding an optimal bidding strategy in sequential auctions, using a dynamic programming technique. The existing method assumes the utility of a user is represented in an additive form. Thus, the remaining endowment of money must be explicitly represented in each state. On the other hand, our method assumes the utility of a user can be represented in a quasi-linear form, and representing the payment as a state-transition cost. Accordingly, we can obtain more than an $m$-fold speed-up in the computation time, where $m$ is the initial endowment of money. Furthermore, we have developed a method for obtaining a semi-optimal bidding strategy under budget constraints.