ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS)
An attack on the Needham-Schroeder public-key authentication protocol
Information Processing Letters
Using CSP to Detect Errors in the TMN Protocol
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
An approach to the formal verification of the two-party cryptographic protocols
ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review
Using encryption for authentication in large networks of computers
Communications of the ACM
Breaking and Fixing the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol Using FDR
TACAs '96 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Tools and Algorithms for Construction and Analysis of Systems
Casper: A Compiler for the Analysis of Security Protocols
CSFW '97 Proceedings of the 10th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Automated analysis of cryptographic protocols using Mur/spl phi/
SP '97 Proceedings of the 1997 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
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SMV is a tool for checking finite state systems. In this paper, a methodology is presented for using SMV to analyze cryptographic protocols. We illustrate the feasibility of the approach by analyzing Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol and discover the well-known attack upon the protocol.