MPEG: a video compression standard for multimedia applications
Communications of the ACM - Special issue on digital multimedia systems
Methods for encrypting and decrypting MPEG video data efficiently
MULTIMEDIA '96 Proceedings of the fourth ACM international conference on Multimedia
Geometries, Codes and Cryptography
Geometries, Codes and Cryptography
An Empirical Study of Secure MPEG Video Transmissions
SNDSS '96 Proceedings of the 1996 Symposium on Network and Distributed System Security (SNDSS '96)
Performance Study of a Selective Encryption Scheme for the Security of Networked, Real-Time Video
ICCCN '95 Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Computer Communications and Networks
Structured Design of Substitution-Permutation Encryption Networks
IEEE Transactions on Computers
Transmission error and compression robustness of 2D chaotic map image encryption schemes
EURASIP Journal on Information Security
Multimedia Tools and Applications
Compression of encrypted visual data
CMS'06 Proceedings of the 10th IFIP TC-6 TC-11 international conference on Communications and Multimedia Security
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In this paper, we describe error preserving encryption mechanisms for transmission of vido over wireless networks. One of the main problems with the secure transmission of data over wireless networks is that the bit errors that occur need to typically be sesolved before decryption can begin. For vido straming applications, this is unacceptable due to the general requirement that video be presented to the user in a continuous manner with low latency. In this paper, we describe a systematic approach to understanding error preserving encryption algorithms. That is, encryption algorithms designed specifically for video to solve this problem. The main objective of this work is to ensure that the basic encryption of the stream can survive bit errors and that the errors are then passed to the application. We make use of the fact that video compression typically results in random byte distribution. Error preserving encryption algorithms are secure against ciphertext only attacks but vulnerable against known plaintext attacks. We limit this vulnerabillity by requiring a key exchange for each session.