Policy algebras for access control: the propositional case

  • Authors:
  • Duminda Wijesekera;Sushil Jajodia

  • Affiliations:
  • George Mason University, Fairfax, VA;George Mason University, Fairfax, VA

  • Venue:
  • CCS '01 Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security
  • Year:
  • 2001

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Abstract

Although different organizations operate under different requirements for protection of their data, increasingly there is a need for organizations to connect their computing resources together to achieve common goals. The fundamental problem addressed in this paper is to capture the algebra used in composing access control policies of collaborating organizations. In doing so, we seek a framework that can be viewed at many levels of abstraction (such as abstract vs. explicit or propositional vs. predicate), independent of implementation mechanisms and environments, and is expressive enough to model existing practices of policy compositions.Propositional version consists of a syntax where policies are viewed as abstract symbols, and semantics consists of authorization state transformers, where an authorization state is a collection of (subject, object, access set) triples and a set of propositions satisfied by them. Syntactic rules are provided to simplify policy expressions without knowing their semantics, thereby supporting algebraic manipulations of uninterpreted policies. Because our algebra is at an abstract level, it can model any policy independent of the language that is used to implement it. We show how to reason about completeness, consistency, unambiguity and of abstractly specified policies and their semantic equivalence.