An approach to finding the attacks on the cryptographic protocols

Authors:
Yongxing Sun;Xinmei Wang
Affiliations:
Xidian University, Xi'an, 710071, P.R.China;Xidian University, Xi'an, 710071, P.R.China
Venue:
ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review
Year:
2000

Citing 8
Cited 0

The Interrogator: Protocol Secuity Analysis

IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering - Special issue on computer security and privacy
A logic of authentication

ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS)
A semantics for a logic of authentication (extended abstract)

PODC '91 Proceedings of the tenth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
A note on the use of timestamps as nonces

ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review
Extending cryptographic logics of belief to key agreement protocols

CCS '93 Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Using CSP to Detect Errors in the TMN Protocol

IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
On Unifying Some Cryptographic Protocol Logics

SP '94 Proceedings of the 1994 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Automated analysis of cryptographic protocols using Mur/spl phi/

SP '97 Proceedings of the 1997 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy

Quantified Score

Hi-index	0.00

Visualization

Abstract

It is necessary to development the formal tools for verifying cryptographic protocols because of the subtlety of cryptographic protocols flaws; In terms of the notions of the restrictive channel and the equivalent message, this paper presents an approach that utilizes the substitution rules of messages and the deduction rules to prove whether the insecure states of the cryptographic protocols are reachable or not, and the analysis of several famous protocols shows the validity of the method.