How to construct random functions
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
How to construct pseudorandom permutations from pseudorandom functions
SIAM Journal on Computing - Special issue on cryptography
Pseudorandomness and Cryptographic Applications
Pseudorandomness and Cryptographic Applications
Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Fast Software Encryption
Randomness, adversaries and computation (random polynomial time)
Randomness, adversaries and computation (random polynomial time)
Efficient Linear Feedback Shift Registers with Maximal Period
Finite Fields and Their Applications
Bernoulli numbers and the probability of a birthday surprise
Discrete Applied Mathematics
New Stream Cipher Designs
SETA'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Sequences and their applications
Gemstone: a new stream cipher using coupled map lattice
Inscrypt'09 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Information security and cryptology
Secure communications scheme based on asymptotic model of deterministic randomness
ACMOS'06 Proceedings of the 8th WSEAS international conference on Automatic control, modeling & simulation
On the discrepancy and linear complexity of some counter-dependent recurrence sequences
SETA'06 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Sequences and Their Applications
Linear weaknesses in t-functions
SETA'12 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Sequences and Their Applications
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A major problem in using iterative number generators of the form xi=f (xi-1) is that they can enter unexpectedly short cycles. This is hard to analyze when the generator is designed, hard to detect in real time when the generator is used, and can have devastating cryptanalytic implications. In this paper we define a measure of security, called sequence diversity, which generalizes the notion of cycle-length for noniterative generators. We then introduce the class of counter-assisted generators and show how to turn any iterative generator (even a bad one designed or seeded by an adversary) into a counter-assisted generator with a provably high diversity, without reducing the quality of generators which are already cryptographically strong. 2001 Elsevier Science