On the relationship between permission and obligation

  • Authors:
  • A. J. I. Jones

  • Affiliations:
  • Univ. of Oslo

  • Venue:
  • ICAIL '87 Proceedings of the 1st international conference on Artificial intelligence and law
  • Year:
  • 1987

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Abstract

In two interesting papers ((1983), (1986)) Thorne McCarty has presented a semantics for the central deontic concepts, permission and obligation, based upon a semantics for an action language. The latter, in turn, was constructed along lines deriving from Pratt-Harel dynamic logic.I shall here offer some critical comments on McCarty's analysis of the relationship between obligation and permission, and of his account of so-called “free-choice” permissions; these come in section II, below. In section I an outline sketch is given of the main features of McCarty's semantics with which the criticism will be concerned.