A strategy-proof multiunit double auction mechanism

  • Authors:

  • Pu Huang;Alan Scheller-Wolf;Katia Sycara

  • Affiliations:

  • Carnegie Mellon University;Carnegie Mellon University;Carnegie Mellon University

  • Venue:
  • Proceedings of the first international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems: part 1
  • Year:
  • 2002

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Abstract

We envision a future economy where e-markets will play an essential role as exchange hubs for commodities and services. Because of their flexibility, we anticipate multi-unit double auctions (MDAs) to play an important role in future's e-markets. In this paper, we present a multi-unit double auction mechanism which is strategy-proof with respect to reservation price, weakly budget-balanced and individually rational.