Agent organizations with utility-based fuzzy coalitions

  • Authors:
  • Leonid B. Sheremetov;José C. Romero Cortés

  • Affiliations:
  • National Technical Univ., Mexico and Mexican Oil Institude, Mexico;National Technical Univ., Mexico and Metropolitan Antonmous Univ., Mexico

  • Venue:
  • Proceedings of the first international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems: part 1
  • Year:
  • 2002

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Abstract

Formation of coalitions in multi-agent systems (MAS) enables the development of efficient agent organizations. In the article, the methodology of the coalition formation in the context of MAS is presented that consists of using the theory of games with fuzzy coalitions in such a way that the negotiations are guided to maximize the benefits or viabilities (i) of each individual agent, (ii) of agents' coalition and even (iii) of a grand coalition that contains all the agents of the system. The optimal imputation is obtained using genetic algorithms. The proposed approach was implemented and tested for the domain of supply chains.