Multiagent perspectives to agile scheduling
BASYS '98 Proceedings of the 3rd IEEE/IFIP international conference on Intelligent systems for manufacturing : multi-agent systems and virtual organizations: multi-agent systems and virtual organizations
Reasoning about commitments and penalties for coordination between autonomous agents
Proceedings of the fifth international conference on Autonomous agents
Economic dynamics of agents in multiple auctions
Proceedings of the fifth international conference on Autonomous agents
Negotiation among self-interested computationally limited agents
Negotiation among self-interested computationally limited agents
Advantages of a leveled commitment contracting protocol
AAAI'96 Proceedings of the thirteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Agent-based service composition through simultaneous negotiation in forward and reverse auctions
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
A Trust/Honesty Model with Adaptive Strategy for Multiagent Semi-Competitive Environments
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Controling Contract Net Protocol by Local Observation for Large-Scale Multi-Agent Systems
CIA '08 Proceedings of the 12th international workshop on Cooperative Information Agents XII
Efficient Allocation of Hierarchically-Decomposable Tasks in a Sensor Web Contract Net
WI-IAT '09 Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Joint Conference on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology - Volume 02
Coordination through plan repair
MICAI'05 Proceedings of the 4th Mexican international conference on Advances in Artificial Intelligence
PRIMA'10 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Principles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems
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The contract net protocol is a widely used protocol in DAI, as it proved to be a flexible and low communication interaction protocol for task assignment. It is however not clear in which manner agents participating in a contract net should allocate their resources if a large number of contract net protocols is performed concurrently. If the agent allocates too many resources too early, e.g. when making a bid, it may not get any bid accepted and resources have been allocated while other negotiations have come to an end and it is no longer able to make bids for them. If it allocates resources too late, e.g. after being awarded the contract, it may have made bids for more tasks than its resources allow for, possibly all being accepted and resulting in commitments that cannot be kept. We call this dilemma the Eager Bidder Problem. Apart from resource allocation this problem is of further importance as it constitutes the "dual" problem to engaging in multiple simultaneous first-price sealed-bid auctions.We present an ad hoc solution and two more complex strategies for solving this problem. Furthermore, we introduce a new method based on a statistical approach. We describe these mechanisms and how they deal with the concept of commitment at different levels. We conclude with criteria for the decision which of these mechanisms is best selected for a given problem domain.