Satisficing coalition formation among agents

  • Authors:
  • Leen-Kiat Soh;Costas Tsatsoulis

  • Affiliations:
  • University of Nebraska, Lincoln, NE;University of Kansas, Lawrence, KS

  • Venue:
  • Proceedings of the first international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems: part 3
  • Year:
  • 2002

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Abstract

In a multiagent system where each agent has only an incomplete view of the world, optimal coalition formation is difficult. Coupling that with real-time and resource constraints often makes the rationalization process infeasible or costly. We propose a coalition formation approach that identifies and builds sub-optimal yet satisficing coalitions among agents to solve a problem detected in the environment. All agents are peers and autonomous. Each is motivated to conserve its own resources while cooperating with other agents to achieve a global task or resource allocation goal. The (initiating) agent-that detects a problem-hastily forms an initial coalition by selecting neighboring agents that it considers to have high potential utilities, based on the capability of each neighbor and its respective inter-agent relationships. The initiating agent next finalizes the coalition via multiple concurrent 1-to-1 negotiations with only neighbors of high potential utility, during which constraints and commitments are exchanged in an argumentation setting.