Hop integrity in computer networks

  • Authors:
  • Mohamed G. Gouda;E. N. (Mootaz) Elnozahy;Chin-Tser Huang;Tommy M. McGuire

  • Affiliations:
  • The University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX;IBM Austin Research Lab, Austin, TX;The University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX;The University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX

  • Venue:
  • IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
  • Year:
  • 2002

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Abstract

A computer network is said to provide hop integrity iff when any router p in the network receives a message m supposedly from an adjacent router q, then p can check that m was indeed sent by q, was not modified after it was sent, and was not a replay of an old message sent from q to p. In this paper, we describe three protocols that can be added to the routers in a computer network so that the network can provide hop integrity, and thus overcome most denial-of-service attacks. These three protocols are a secret exchange protocol, a weak integrity protocol, and a strong integrity protocol. All three protocols are stateless, require small overhead, and do not constrain the network protocol in the routers in any way.