The official PGP user's guide
The quest for security in mobile ad hoc networks
MobiHoc '01 Proceedings of the 2nd ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking & computing
Relying Party Credentials Framework
CT-RSA 2001 Proceedings of the 2001 Conference on Topics in Cryptology: The Cryptographer's Track at RSA
Proceedings of the International Workshop on Security Protocols
Access Control Meets Public Key Infrastructure, Or: Assigning Roles to Strangers
SP '00 Proceedings of the 2000 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Certificate-based access control for widely distributed resources
SSYM'99 Proceedings of the 8th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 8
Towards secure resource sharing for impromptu collaboration in pervasive computing
Proceedings of the 2007 ACM symposium on Applied computing
A security policy system for mobile autonomic networks
Proceedings of the 1st international conference on Autonomic computing and communication systems
Robust RSA distributed signatures for large-scale long-lived ad hoc networks
Journal of Computer Security - Special Issue on Security of Ad-hoc and Sensor Networks
Adaptive access control in coordination-based mobile agent systems
Software Engineering for Multi-Agent Systems III
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Ad-hoc networks facilitate interconnectivity between mobile devices without the support of a network infrastructure. In this paper we propose a flexible credential verification mechanism, which improves the likelihood that participants in an ad-hoc network can verify each other's credentials despite the lack of access to certification and attribute authorities. Users maintain Credential Assertion Statements (CASs), which are formed through extraction of X.509 and attribute certificates into an interoperable XML form. Trusted entities that can verify the credentials listed in the CAS can then issue signed Assertion Signature Statements (ASSs) to other participants in the ad-hoc network. In addition, each user maintains a key ring, which comprises the list of public-keys trusted to sign credential assertion statements. All public-keys in the ring are assigned a trustworthiness level. When a user presents his/her CAS together with matching ASSs to a verifier, the verifier checks the signatures in the ASSs against its key ring to determine whether credentials in the CAS are authentic and acceptable. Transitivity of trust is generally not allowed, but there are exceptional cases in which it is permitted.