Towards a general theory of action and time
Artificial Intelligence
A first-order conditional logic for prototypical properties
Artificial Intelligence
Nonmonotonic logic and temporal projection
Artificial Intelligence
Reasoning about change: time and causation from the standpoint of artificial intelligence
Reasoning about change: time and causation from the standpoint of artificial intelligence
An approach to default reasoning based on a first-order conditional logic: revised report
Artificial Intelligence
A simple solution to the Yale shooting problem
Proceedings of the first international conference on Principles of knowledge representation and reasoning
Motivated action theory: a formal theory of causal reasoning
Artificial Intelligence
Artificial Intelligence
Applied Intelligence
Temporal representation and reasoning in artificial intelligence: Issues and approaches
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Ramification in the Normative Method of Causality
ECSQARU '01 Proceedings of the 6th European Conference on Symbolic and Quantitative Approaches to Reasoning with Uncertainty
From the textual description of an accident to its causes
Artificial Intelligence
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We present a causal theory based on an interventionist conception of causality, i.e., a preference to select causes among a set of actions which an agent has the ability to perform or not (free will). Emphasis is put on the temporal and explanatory aspects of causal reasoning. We introduce a formal framework enabling to define the notion of voluntary cause in a way allowing for an effective retrieval of causes in a given situation. The causal knowledge is represented by causal rules of two kinds: strict and “normal”. The latter is based on the notions of preferred time lines (futures that the agent normally has in mind when (s)he opts for performing the action) and of inhibiting events (the occurrence of which prevents the anticipated effect to happen). A situation is described by a set of events occurring on time lines; this description is completed by default assumptions (when an agent performs an action, we assume, unless this is inconsistent, that its preconditions are fulfilled and that no inhibiting event will take place). An example is presented, extension to first‐order is briefly discussed, and our approach is compared to related works.