Repeated Play of Potential Games

Authors:
Yu. M. Ermoliev;S. D. Flaam
Affiliations:
IIASA, Laxenburg A-2361 Austria. ermoliev@iiasa.ac.at;Department of Economics, University of Bergen 5007, Norway. sjur.flaam@econ.uib.no
Venue:
Cybernetics and Systems Analysis
Year:
2002

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Abstract

So-called potential functions are important, prominent, and common to many diverse fields, including optimization, dynamic processes, and physics. Monderer and Shapley have added a class of noncooperative games to that list. In the present paper, their notion is extended and repeated play of such games is considered. A unified convergence analysis is provided and procedures that account for efficiency or viability are shown.