Coordination and Cooperation in Dyadic Relationships

  • Authors:
  • G. Lawrence Zahn;Gerrit Wolf

  • Affiliations:
  • Graduate School of Management, University of California, Riverside, Riverside, CA 92521. E-mail: lawrence.zahn@ucr.edu;State University of New York, Stony Brook. E-mail: gwolf@fac.har.sunysb.edu

  • Venue:
  • Computational & Mathematical Organization Theory
  • Year:
  • 1997

Quantified Score

Hi-index 0.00

Visualization

Abstract

A Markov model with a coordination parameter isdeveloped to depict coordination and cooperation decisionprocesses in 2 × 2 game relationships. The parameters ofthe model can be used to define and measure various forms ofinfluence. The model is applied to data collected using aprisoner‘s dilemma payoff structure to represent thesuperior-subordinate relationship. The results demonstrate theusefulness of the model and the measures of influence. Superiorsand subordinates are more likely to coordinate following mutualcooperation, achieving matching behaviors more frequently thanan independent-decisions model would predict. Subordinates showslightly more influence over leaders‘ behaviors than vice versa.