Generation Supply Bidding in Perfectly Competitive Electricity Markets

  • Authors:
  • George Gross;David Finlay

  • Affiliations:
  • University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, IL 61801, USA;OOCL Transportation Co., Mountain View, CA 94043, USA

  • Venue:
  • Computational & Mathematical Organization Theory
  • Year:
  • 2000

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Abstract

This paper reports on the development of acomprehensive framework for the analysis and formulation of bids incompetitive electricity markets. Competing entities submit offers ofpower and energy to meet the next day's load. We use the England andWales Power Pool as the basis for the development of a very generalcompetitive power pool (CPP) framework. The framework provides thebasis for solving the CPP dispatcher problem and for specifying theoptimal bidding strategies. The CPP dispatcher selects the winningbids for the right to serve load each period of the schedulinghorizon. The dispatcher must commit sufficient generation to meetthe forecasted load and reserve requirements throughout thescheduling horizon. All the unique constraints under which electricalgenerators operate including start-up and shut-down timerestrictions, reserve requirements and unit output limits must betaken into account. We develop an analytical formulation of theproblem faced by a bidder in the CPP by specifying a strategy thatmaximizes his profits. The optimal bidding strategy is solvedanalytically for the case of perfect competition. The study in thiswork takes into account the principal sources of uncertainty—theload forecast and the actions of the other competitors. Theformulation and solution methodology effectively exploit a Lagrangianrelaxation based approach. We have conducted a wide range ofnumerical studies; a sample of numerical results are presented toillustrate the robustness and superiority of the analyticallydeveloped bidding strategies.