Artificial Intelligence
Reasoning about knowledge
Deontic logic in computer science: normative system specification
Deontic logic in computer science: normative system specification
Logical representation and computation of optimal decisions in a qualitative setting
AAAI '98/IAAI '98 Proceedings of the fifteenth national/tenth conference on Artificial intelligence/Innovative applications of artificial intelligence
Reasoning about Information Change
Journal of Logic, Language and Information
LFCS '94 Proceedings of the Third International Symposium on Logical Foundations of Computer Science
Commitments Among Autonomous Agents in Information-Rich Environments
Proceedings of the 8th European Workshop on Modelling Autonomous Agents in a Multi-Agent World: Multi-Agent Rationality
PRICAI '96 Proceedings from the Workshop on Intelligent Agent Systems, Theoretical and Practical Issues
Social and Individual Commitment
PRICAI '96 Proceedings from the Workshop on Intelligent Agent Systems, Theoretical and Practical Issues
Commitments in the Architecture of a Limited, Rational Agent
PRICAI '96 Proceedings from the Workshop on Intelligent Agent Systems, Theoretical and Practical Issues
Actions That Make You Change Your Mind (Extended Abstract)
KI '95 Proceedings of the 19th Annual German Conference on Artificial Intelligence: Advances in Artificial Intelligence
Modelling Social Agents: Communication as Action
ECAI '96 Proceedings of the Workshop on Intelligent Agents III, Agent Theories, Architectures, and Languages
AI*IA '95 Proceedings of the 4th Congress of the Italian Association for Artificial Intelligence on Topics in Artificial Intelligence
Decision-making under ordinal preferences and comparative uncertainty
UAI'97 Proceedings of the Thirteenth conference on Uncertainty in artificial intelligence
Defining relative likelihood in partially-ordered preferential structures
UAI'96 Proceedings of the Twelfth international conference on Uncertainty in artificial intelligence
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In this paper, we analyze the relationship between commitmentand obligation from a logical viewpoint. The principle of commitmentimplying obligation is proven in a specific logic of action preferencewhich is a generalization of Meyer's dynamic deontic logic. In theproposed formalism, an agent's commitment to goals is considered as aspecial kind of action which can change one's deontic preference andone's obligation to take some action is based on the preference and theeffects of the action. In this logic, it is shown that an agent has theobligation to take any action which is necessary for achieving as manycommitted goals as possible. The semantics of our logic is based on thepossible world models for the dynamic logic of actions. A binarypreference relation between possible worlds is associated with themodel. Then the preference between actions are determined by comparingthat of their consequences. According to the semantics, while thepreference will influence the agent's choice of action, commitment is akind of action that will change the agent's preference. Thus we can showhow obligations arise from commitments via updating of deonticpreference. The integrated semantics make it possible to express andreason about the mutual relationship among these mental attitudes in acommon logic.