A Logical Analysis of the Relationship between Commitment and Obligation

  • Authors:
  • Churn-Jung Liau

  • Affiliations:
  • Institute of Information Science, Academia Sinica, 128 Yen-Chiu-Yuan Road, Sec. II, 115 Taipei, Taiwan E-mail: liaucj@iis.sinica.edu.tw

  • Venue:
  • Journal of Logic, Language and Information
  • Year:
  • 2001

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Abstract

In this paper, we analyze the relationship between commitmentand obligation from a logical viewpoint. The principle of commitmentimplying obligation is proven in a specific logic of action preferencewhich is a generalization of Meyer's dynamic deontic logic. In theproposed formalism, an agent's commitment to goals is considered as aspecial kind of action which can change one's deontic preference andone's obligation to take some action is based on the preference and theeffects of the action. In this logic, it is shown that an agent has theobligation to take any action which is necessary for achieving as manycommitted goals as possible. The semantics of our logic is based on thepossible world models for the dynamic logic of actions. A binarypreference relation between possible worlds is associated with themodel. Then the preference between actions are determined by comparingthat of their consequences. According to the semantics, while thepreference will influence the agent's choice of action, commitment is akind of action that will change the agent's preference. Thus we can showhow obligations arise from commitments via updating of deonticpreference. The integrated semantics make it possible to express andreason about the mutual relationship among these mental attitudes in acommon logic.