Thinking and Computing: Computers as Special Kinds of Signs

  • Authors:
  • James H. Fetzer

  • Affiliations:
  • Department of Philosophy, University of Minnesota, Duluth, MN 55812, U.S.A. E-mail: jfetzer@d.umn.edu

  • Venue:
  • Minds and Machines
  • Year:
  • 1997

Quantified Score

Hi-index 0.00

Visualization

Abstract

Cognitive science has been dominated by the computational conception thatcognition is computation across representations. To the extent to whichcognition as computation across representations is supposed to be apurposive, meaningful, algorithmic, problem-solving activity, however,computers appear to be incapable of cognition. They are devices that canfacilitate computations on the basis of semantic grounding relations asspecial kinds of signs. Even their algorithmic, problem-solving characterarises from their interpretation by human users. Strictly speaking,computers as such – apart from human users – are not onlyincapable of cognition, but even incapable of computation, properlyconstrued. If we want to understand the nature of thought, then we have tostudy thinking, not computing, because they are not the same thing.