Learning Causes: Psychological Explanations of Causal Explanation^1

  • Authors:
  • Clark Glymour

  • Affiliations:
  • University of California at San Diego and Carnegie Mellon University

  • Venue:
  • Minds and Machines
  • Year:
  • 1998

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Abstract

I argue that psychologists interested in human causal judgment should understand and adopt a representation of causal mechanisms by directedgraphs that encode conditional independence (screening off) relations. Iillustrate the benefits of that representation, now widely used in computerscience and increasingly in statistics, by (i) showing that a dispute inpsychology between ’mechanist‘ and ’associationist‘ psychological theoriesof causation rests on a false and confused dichotomy; (ii) showing that arecent, much-cited experiment, purporting to show that human subjects,incorrectly let large causes ’overshadow‘ small causes, misrepresents themost likely, and warranted, causal explanation available to the subjects,in the light of which their responses were normative; (iii) showing how arecent psychological theory (due to P. Cheng) of human judgment of causalpower can be considerably generalized: and (iv) suggesting a range ofpossible experiments comparing human and computer abilities to extractcausal information from associations.