Explanation in Scientists and Children

  • Authors:

  • William F. Brewer;Clark A. Chinn;Ala Samarapungavan

  • Affiliations:

  • Department of Psychology, University of Illinois, IL, U.S.A.;Department of Educational Psychology, Rutgers University, NJ, U.S.A.;Educational Studies, Purdue University, IN, U.S.A.

  • Venue:
  • Minds and Machines
  • Year:
  • 1998

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Abstract

In this paper we provide a psychological account of the nature anddevelopment of explanation. We propose that an explanation is an accountthat provides a conceptual framework for a phenomenon that leads to afeeling of understanding in the reader/hearer. The explanatory conceptualframework goes beyond the original phenomenon, integrates diverse aspectsof the world, and shows how the original phenomenon follows from theframework. We propose that explanations in everyday life are judged on thecriteria of empirical accuracy, scope, consistency, simplicity, andplausibility. We conclude that explanations in science are evaluated by thesame criteria, plus those of precision, formalisms, and fruitfulness. Wediscuss several types of explanation that are used in everyday life –causal/mechanical, functional, and intentional. We present evidence toshow that young children produce explanations (often with different contentfrom those of adults) that have the same essential form as those used byadults. We also provide evidence that children use the same evaluationcriteria as adults, but may not apply those additional criteria for theevaluation of explanations that are used by scientists.