Let‘s Dance! The Equivocation in Chalmers‘ Dancing Qualia Argument

  • Authors:

  • Bram Van Heuveln;Eric Dietrich;Michiharu Oshima

  • Affiliations:

  • Philosophy and Computers and Cognitive Science, Department of Philosopy, Binghamton University, Binghamton, NY 13902, U.S.A. (E-mail: Email: bram@turing.paccs.binghamton.edu/ Email: dietrich@turin ...;Philosophy and Computers and Cognitive Science, Department of Philosopy, Binghamton University, Binghamton, NY 13902, U.S.A. (E-mail: Email: bram@turing.paccs.binghamton.edu/ Email: dietrich@turin ...;Philosophy and Computers and Cognitive Science, Department of Philosopy, Binghamton University, Binghamton, NY 13902, U.S.A. (E-mail: Email: bram@turing.paccs.binghamton.edu/ Email: dietrich@turin ...

  • Venue:
  • Minds and Machines
  • Year:
  • 1998

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Abstract

David Chalmers‘ dancing qualia argument is intended to show thatphenomenal experiences, or qualia, are organizational invariants. Thedancing qualia argument is a reductio ad absurdum, attempting to demonstratethat holding an alternative position, such as the famous inverted spectrumargument, leads one to an implausible position about the relation betweenconsciousness and cognition. In this paper, we argue that Chalmers‘ dancingqualia argument fails to establish the plausibility of qualia beingorganizational invariants. Even stronger, we will argue that the gap in theargument cannot be closed. .