Mind over machine: the power of human intuition and expertise in the era of the computer
Mind over machine: the power of human intuition and expertise in the era of the computer
A neurocomputational perspective: the nature of mind and the structure of science
A neurocomputational perspective: the nature of mind and the structure of science
Some comments on Smolensky and Fodor
The foundation of artificial intelligence---a sourcebook
Recursive distributed representations
Artificial Intelligence - On connectionist symbol processing
Mundane reasoning by settling on a plausible model
Artificial Intelligence - On connectionist symbol processing
Distributed Representations, Simple Recurrent Networks, And Grammatical Structure
Machine Learning - Connectionist approaches to language learning
The computational brain
Solving the frame problem: a mathematical investigation of the common sense law of inertia
Solving the frame problem: a mathematical investigation of the common sense law of inertia
Neural Pathways of Embodied Simulation
Anticipatory Behavior in Adaptive Learning Systems
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This paper investigates connectionism‘s potential to solve the frameproblem. The frame problem arises in the context of modelling the humanability to see the relevant consequences of events in a situation. It hasbeen claimed to be unsolvable for classical cognitive science, but easilymanageable for connectionism. We will focus on a representational approachto the frame problem which advocates the use of intrinsic representations.We argue that although connectionism‘s distributed representations may lookpromising from this perspective, doubts can be raised about the potential ofdistributed representations to allow large amounts of complexly structuredinformation to be adequately encoded and processed. It isquestionable whether connectionist models that are claimed to effectivelyrepresent structured information can be scaled up to a realistic extent. Weconclude that the frame problem provides a difficulty to connectionism thatis no less serious than the obstacle it constitutes for classical cognitive science.