Explanation, Representation and the Dynamical Hypothesis

  • Authors:
  • John Symons

  • Affiliations:
  • Department of Philosophy, The University of Texas at El Paso, El Paso, Texas 79968 USA/ E-mail: jsymons@utep.edu

  • Venue:
  • Minds and Machines
  • Year:
  • 2001

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Abstract

This paper challenges arguments that systematic patterns of intelligent behavior license the claim that representations must play a role in the cognitive system analogous to that played by syntactical structures in a computer program. In place of traditional computational models, I argue that research inspired by Dynamical Systems theory can support an alternative view of representations. My suggestion is that we treat linguistic and representational structures as providing complex multi-dimensional targets for the development of individual brains. This approach acknowledges the indispensability of the intentional or representational idiom in psychological explanation without locating representations in the brains of intelligent agents.