Randomized algorithms
Secure and Efficient Off-Line Digital Money (Extended Abstract)
ICALP '93 Proceedings of the 20th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming
CRYPTO '88 Proceedings of the 8th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Disposable Zero-Knowledge Authentications and Their Applications to Untraceable Electronic Cash
CRYPTO '89 Proceedings of the 9th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
CRYPTO '91 Proceedings of the 11th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
An Efficient Divisible Electronic Cash Scheme
CRYPTO '95 Proceedings of the 15th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Efficient Electronic Money (Extended Abstract)
ASIACRYPT '94 Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptology: Advances in Cryptology
Proceedings of the International Workshop on Security Protocols
Electronic Lottery Tickets as Micropayments
FC '97 Proceedings of the First International Conference on Financial Cryptography
On the Continuum Between On-line and Off-line E-cash Systems - 1
FC '97 Proceedings of the First International Conference on Financial Cryptography
An Efficient Micropayment System Based on Probabilistic Polling
FC '97 Proceedings of the First International Conference on Financial Cryptography
Agora: a minimal distributed protocol for electronic commerce
WOEC'96 Proceedings of the 2nd conference on Proceedings of the Second USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce - Volume 2
Distributed architectures for electronic cash schemes: a survey
International Journal of Parallel, Emergent and Distributed Systems
Double spending protection for e-cash based on risk management
ISC'10 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Information security
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
We analyze “coin-wallet” and “balance-wallet” under partial real-time audit, and compute upper bounds on theft due to the fact that not all the transactions are audited in real time, assuming that everything else is perfect. In particular, we assume that the audit regime holds for innocent payees. Let v be the maximum allowed balance in a wallet, and 0≤μ≤1 be the fraction of transactions that are audited in real time in an audit round. Assume one unit transactions. We show that the upper bound on expected theft for coin-wallet is lim μ→0μ−2, while for plausible (similar) parameter choice the bound for a balance-wallet is O(exp (mvμ)), where 1m. The former is nicely bounded for small transactions, however, the bound for balance-wallet can become huge in those cases where we require very small false alarm probability. We conclude that partial audit, may be suitable for coin-wallets with low denomination coins, and possibly for balance-wallet, when we may tolerate a relatively high false alarm rate, but it may be too risky for balance-wallet, where very low false alarm rate is required.