An evaluation method on the integrated safeguards based on fuzzy theory

  • Authors:

  • Hiroshi Matsuoka;Yasushi Nishiwaki;Alexander Ryjov;Alexander Belenki

  • Affiliations:

  • Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute, Japan;Institute for Miedical Physics, University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria and Atomic Energy Research Institute, Kinki University, Japan;Department of Mechanics and Mathematics, Lomonosov' Moscow State University, Russia;Department of Mechanics and Mathematics, Lomonosov' Moscow State University, Russia

  • Venue:
  • Information Sciences—Informatics and Computer Science: An International Journal - Special issue: Intelligent information systems and applications
  • Year:
  • 2002

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Abstract

Many countries concluding comprehensive safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are currently going to agree a new additional protocol (INFCIRC/540). The protocol will make them provide more information to the IAEA. The expanded framework is expected to establish stronger and more efficient IAEA safeguards system, which we call "Integrated Safeguards". However, there seems to be no evaluation method that enables inspectorate to derive a final evaluation from the information collected through the Integrated Safeguards Implementation. Evaluation of safeguards-effectiveness should be to estimate a degree of assurance to what extent the objective is attained. In this case, the assurance-degree of the following proposition should be given, "No nuclear material in a country is used for manufacture of nuclear explosive devices". In this paper, a simple method is proposed to calculate the assurance-degree of non-manufacture of nuclear explosive devices. The method uses a simple logic tree and fuzzy linguistic variables as its inputs. In addition, the method is shown to be useful for considering the efficient implementation of safeguards. For example, case-studies by the method show that conventional safeguards inspection efforts relevant to low enriched uranium and spent fuels can be reduced to half by introducing the integrated safeguards activities relevant to highly enriched uranium and plutonium.