Aspiration-based and reciprocity-based rules in learning dynamics for symmetric normal-form games

Authors:
Dale O. Stahl;Ernan Haruvy
Affiliations:
University of Texas at Austin;University of Texas at Dallas
Venue:
Journal of Mathematical Psychology
Year:
2002

Citing 2
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Abstract

Psychologically based rules are important in human behavior and have the potential of explaining equilibrium selection and separatrix crossings to a payoff dominant equilibrium in coordination games. We show how a rule learning theory can easily accommodate behavioral rules such as aspiration-based experimentation and reciprocity-based cooperation and how to test for the significance of additional rules. We confront this enhanced rule learning model with experimental data on games with multiple equilibria and separatrix-crossing behavior. Maximum likelihood results do not support aspiration-based experimentation or anticipated reciprocity as significant explanatory factors, but do support a small propensity for non-aspiration-based experimentation by random belief and non-reciprocity-based cooperation.