Rules of encounter: designing conventions for automated negotiation among computers
Rules of encounter: designing conventions for automated negotiation among computers
Computational organization theory
Computational organization theory
Mechanism design for automated negotiation, and its application to task oriented domains
Artificial Intelligence
Collaborative plans for complex group action
Artificial Intelligence
Internet economics
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In this paper, we propose knowledge transaction as basic constitutes of social interaction. Knowledge transaction among agents with heterogeneous knowledge are formulated as knowledge trading games. Each agent has idiosyncratic utility function defined over his private knowledge and common knowledge shared with the other agents. We consider two types of the utility functions, the convex and concave utility functions. The knowledge transaction are formulated as symmetric and asymmetric coordination games with the combination of the trading agents with those different types of the utility functions. Knowledge transaction in an organization are formulated as the continuous of heterogeneous games. We investigate what characteristics of an organization promote knowledge transaction or discourage sharing common knowledge.