Random oracles are practical: a paradigm for designing efficient protocols
CCS '93 Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Computer and communications security
A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems
Communications of the ACM
Secure and Efficient Off-Line Digital Money (Extended Abstract)
ICALP '93 Proceedings of the 20th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming
CRYPTO '88 Proceedings of the 8th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Disposable Zero-Knowledge Authentications and Their Applications to Untraceable Electronic Cash
CRYPTO '89 Proceedings of the 9th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
How To Break and Repair A "Provably Secure" Untraceable Payment System
CRYPTO '91 Proceedings of the 11th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
An Efficient Divisible Electronic Cash Scheme
CRYPTO '95 Proceedings of the 15th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Efficient Electronic Money (Extended Abstract)
ASIACRYPT '94 Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptology: Advances in Cryptology
"Indirect Discourse Proof": Achieving Efficient Fair Off-Line E-cash
ASIACRYPT '96 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
On the Security of ElGamal Based Encryption
PKC '98 Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptography: Public Key Cryptography
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In this paper we develop a new protocol for untraceable electronic cash, in which the bank involvement in the payment transaction between a user and a receiver is eliminated. The user withdraws electronic "coins" from the bank and uses them to pay to a receiver. The receiver subsequently deposits the coins back to the bank. In the process the user remains anonymous, unless she spends a single coin more than once (double spend). The security of the system is based on DLA (Discrete Logarithm Assumption) and the cut-and-choose methodology.