An attack on a signature scheme proposed by Okamoto and Shiraishi
Lecture notes in computer sciences; 218 on Advances in cryptology---CRYPTO 85
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The security of several signature schemes and cryptosystems, essentially proposed by Okamoto, is based on the difficulty of solving polynomial equations or inequations modulo n. The encryption and the decryption of these schemes are very simple when the factorisation of the modulus, a large composite number, is known.We show here that we can, for any odd n, solve, in polynomial probabilistic time, quadratic equations modulo n, even if the factorisation of n is hidden, provided we are given a sufficiently good approximation of the solutions. We thus deduce how to break Okamoto's second degree cryptosystem and we extend, in this way, Brickell's and Shamir's previous attacks.Our main tool is lattices that we use after a linearisation of the problem, and the success of our method depends on the geometrical regularity of a particular kind of lattices.Our paper is organized as follows: First we recall the problems already posed, their partial solutions and describe how our results solve extensions of these problems. We then introduce our main tool, lattices and show how their geometrical properties fit in our subject. Finally, we deduce our results. These methods can be generalized to higher dimensions.