Timestamps in key distribution protocols
Communications of the ACM
A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems
Communications of the ACM
Using encryption for authentication in large networks of computers
Communications of the ACM
Verifying security protocols with Brutus
ACM Transactions on Software Engineering and Methodology (TOSEM)
A State-Exploration Technique for Spi-Calculus Testing Equivalence Verification
FORTE/PSTV 2000 Proceedings of the FIP TC6 WG6.1 Joint International Conference on Formal Description Techniques for Distributed Systems and Communication Protocols (FORTE XIII) and Protocol Specification, Testing and Verification (PSTV XX)
Breaking and Fixing the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol Using FDR
TACAs '96 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Tools and Algorithms for Construction and Analysis of Systems
Casper: A Compiler for the Analysis of Security Protocols
CSFW '97 Proceedings of the 10th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Automated analysis of cryptographic protocols using Mur/spl phi/
SP '97 Proceedings of the 1997 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Static verification of security requirements in role based CSCW systems
Proceedings of the eighth ACM symposium on Access control models and technologies
A Mechanically Proved Development Combining B Abstract Systems and Spin
QSIC '04 Proceedings of the Quality Software, Fourth International Conference
Design of a CIL Connector to SPIN
COMPSAC '04 Proceedings of the 28th Annual International Computer Software and Applications Conference - Volume 01
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Using SPIN to Detect Vulnerabilities in the AACS Drive-Host Authentication Protocol
FORTE '08 Proceedings of the 28th IFIP WG 6.1 international conference on Formal Techniques for Networked and Distributed Systems
Automated Evaluation of Secure Route Discovery in MANET Protocols
SPIN '08 Proceedings of the 15th international workshop on Model Checking Software
Model checking the SET purchasing process protocol with SPIN
WiCOM'09 Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Wireless communications, networking and mobile computing
Secure transaction protocol analysis: models and applications
Secure transaction protocol analysis: models and applications
State coverage metrics for specification-based testing with Büchi automata
TAP'11 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Tests and proofs
An improved case-based approach to LTL model checking
RISE'05 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Rapid Integration of Software Engineering Techniques
Effective reduction of cryptographic protocols specification for model-checking with Spin
Annales UMCS, Informatica - Security Systems
Formal security analysis of Ariadne secure routing protocol using model checking
International Journal of Ad Hoc and Ubiquitous Computing
Generic verification of security protocols
SPIN'05 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Model Checking Software
SPIN'05 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Model Checking Software
FMOODS'10/FORTE'10 Proceedings of the 12th IFIP WG 6.1 international conference and 30th IFIP WG 6.1 international conference on Formal Techniques for Distributed Systems
Universally composable symbolic analysis of mutual authentication and key-exchange protocols
TCC'06 Proceedings of the Third conference on Theory of Cryptography
Modelling trusted web applications
KES-AMSTA'12 Proceedings of the 6th KES international conference on Agent and Multi-Agent Systems: technologies and applications
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This paper explores the use of Spin for the verification of cryptographic protocol security properties. A general method is proposed to build a Promela model of the protocol and of the intruder capabilities. The method is illustrated showing the modeling of a classical case study, i.e. the Needham-Schroeder Public Key Authentication Protocol. Using the model so built, Spin can find a known attack on the protocol, and it correctly validates the fixed version of the protocol.