Using SPIN to Verify Security Properties of Cryptographic Protocols

  • Authors:
  • Paolo Maggi;Riccardo Sisto

  • Affiliations:
  • -;-

  • Venue:
  • Proceedings of the 9th International SPIN Workshop on Model Checking of Software
  • Year:
  • 2002

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Abstract

This paper explores the use of Spin for the verification of cryptographic protocol security properties. A general method is proposed to build a Promela model of the protocol and of the intruder capabilities. The method is illustrated showing the modeling of a classical case study, i.e. the Needham-Schroeder Public Key Authentication Protocol. Using the model so built, Spin can find a known attack on the protocol, and it correctly validates the fixed version of the protocol.