Building Software Recovery Assertions from a Fault Injection-based Propagation Analysis

  • Authors:
  • Jeffrey M. Voas

  • Affiliations:
  • -

  • Venue:
  • COMPSAC '97 Proceedings of the 21st International Computer Software and Applications Conference
  • Year:
  • 1997

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Abstract

We have investigated a fault injection-based tech- nique for undermining the ability of software compo- nents to produce undesirable outputs into the state of the system. Undesirable outputs are any class of out- puts that a component must not release into the state of the system given its current environment. Software components are said to be \failure-tolerant" if they release desirable outputs regardless of the program- mer faults, potential malicious input data directed against the component, and other non-malicious but corrupted input data. Our technology assesses the failure tolerance of software components after simu- lated program state corruptions are injected into the components as they execute. Based on the types of outputs that result from fault injection, our technique knows where "recovery assertions" (which act some- what like antibodies do in an organism) should be in- jected into software components to ensure desirable system outputs; the second part of our approach then suggests what the assertions should be.