Intention is choice with commitment
Artificial Intelligence
First-Order Dynamic Logic
An Operational Semantics for a PRS-Like Agent Architecture
AI '01 Proceedings of the 14th Australian Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence: Advances in Artificial Intelligence
Bringing About Rationality: Incorporating Plans Into a BDI Agent Architecture
PRICAI '96 Proceedings of the 4th Pacific Rim International Conference on Artificial Intelligence: Topics in Artificial Intelligence
Modelling PRS-Like Agents' Mental States
PRICAI '02 Proceedings of the 7th Pacific Rim International Conference on Artificial Intelligence: Trends in Artificial Intelligence
Semantical consideration on floyo-hoare logic
SFCS '76 Proceedings of the 17th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Decision-making in an embedded reasoning system
IJCAI'89 Proceedings of the 11th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
Asymmetry thesis and side-effect problems in linear-time and branching-time intention logics
IJCAI'91 Proceedings of the 12th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Proving BDI Properties of Agent-Oriented Programming Languages
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
An analysis of three puzzles in the logic of intention
AI'06 Proceedings of the 19th Australian joint conference on Artificial Intelligence: advances in Artificial Intelligence
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In this paper, we elaborate on our earlier work on modelling the mental states of PRS-like agents by considering the logical properties of intentions and various rationality postulates for PRS-like agents that are a consequence of this modelling, in particular Bratman's asymmetry thesis, the side effect problem for intentions and Rao and Georgeff's nontransference principles. We show that PRS-like agents do enjoy many of the accepted logical properties of intention and rationality postulates as automatic consequences of our approach, though, as we have argued before, PRS-like agents do not have intentions in the sense required by Bratman's theory.