Cryptanalysis of the Reduced-Round RC6

  • Authors:
  • Atsuko Miyaji;Masao Nonaka

  • Affiliations:
  • -;-

  • Venue:
  • ICICS '02 Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Information and Communications Security
  • Year:
  • 2002

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Abstract

In this paper, we propose the efficient and feasible key recovery algorithm against the reduced-round RC6 without whitening, called RC6W. Our attack applies to a rather large number of rounds. RC6W with r rounds can be broken in a success probability of 90% by using 28.1r-13.8 plaintexts. Therefore, our attack can break RC6W with 17 rounds by using 2123.9 plaintexts in a probability of 90%.