STOC '87 Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
How to prove yourself: practical solutions to identification and signature problems
Proceedings on Advances in cryptology---CRYPTO '86
Completeness theorems for non-cryptographic fault-tolerant distributed computation
STOC '88 Proceedings of the twentieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Multiparty unconditionally secure protocols
STOC '88 Proceedings of the twentieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Wallet Databases with Observers
CRYPTO '92 Proceedings of the 12th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Security of Signed ElGamal Encryption
ASIACRYPT '00 Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
Introduction to Secure Computation
Lectures on Data Security, Modern Cryptology in Theory and Practice, Summer School, Aarhus, Denmark, July 1998
On the Security of ElGamal Based Encryption
PKC '98 Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptography: Public Key Cryptography
Protocols for secure computations
SFCS '82 Proceedings of the 23rd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
A secure and optimally efficient multi-authority election scheme
EUROCRYPT'97 Proceedings of the 16th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
Matchmaking protocol is a procedure to find matched pairs in registered groups of participants depending on their choices, while preserving their privacy. In this study we define the concept of matchmaking and construct a simple and efficient matchmaking protocol under the simple rule that two members become a matched pair only when they have chosen each other. In matchmaking protocol, participant's privacy is of prime concern, specially losers' choices should not be opened. Our basic approach to achieve privacy is finding collisions among multiple secure commitments without decryption. For this purpose we build a protocol to find collisions in ElGamal ciphertexts without decryption using Michels and Stadler's protocol [MS97] of proving the equality or inequality of two discrete logarithms. Correctness is guaranteed because all procedures are universally verifiable.