Linear cryptanalysis method for DES cipher
EUROCRYPT '93 Workshop on the theory and application of cryptographic techniques on Advances in cryptology
Differential Cryptanalysis of DES-like Cryptosystems
CRYPTO '90 Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Cryptanalysis of Block Ciphers with Probabilistic Non-linear Relations of Low Degree
CRYPTO '98 Proceedings of the 18th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Probabilistic Higher Order Differential Attack and Higher Order Bent Functions
ASIACRYPT '99 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
New Structure of Block Ciphers with Provable Security against Differential and Linear Cryptanalysis
Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Fast Software Encryption
New Block Encryption Algorithm MISTY
FSE '97 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Fast Software Encryption
The Interpolation Attack on Block Ciphers
FSE '97 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Fast Software Encryption
Improving the Higher Order Differential Attack and Cryptanalysis of the KN Cipher
ISW '97 Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Information Security
Markov ciphers and differential cryptanalysis
EUROCRYPT'91 Proceedings of the 10th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
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We study on the security against higher order differential attack on block ciphers with two-block structure which have provable security against differential and linear cryptanalysis. The two-block structures are classified three types according to the location of round function such as C(Center)-type, R(Right)-type, and L(Left)-type. We prove that in the case of 4 rounds encryption function, these three types provide an equal strength against higher order differential attack and that in the case of 5 or more rounds, R-type is weaker than C-type and L-type. Moreover, we show that these facts also hold similarly for probabilistic higher order differential attack.