Auction allocation of computing resources
Communications of the ACM
An auction algorithm for the max-flow problem
Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications
Market-based control: a paradigm for distributed resource allocation
Market-based control: a paradigm for distributed resource allocation
The Michigan Internet AuctionBot: a configurable auction server for human and software agents
AGENTS '98 Proceedings of the second international conference on Autonomous agents
Online computation and competitive analysis
Online computation and competitive analysis
Computationally Manageable Combinational Auctions
Management Science
Commodity trading using an agent-based iterated double auction
Proceedings of the third annual conference on Autonomous Agents
Optimal Bidding Algorithms Against Cheating in Multiple-Object Auctions
SIAM Journal on Computing
Efficient private bidding and auctions with an oblivious third party
CCS '99 Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Electronic commerce
IEEE Internet Computing
Speeding Up Ascending-Bid Auctions
IJCAI '99 Proceedings of the Sixteenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Improved Algorithms for Optimal Winner Determination in Combinatorial Auctions and Generalizations
Proceedings of the Seventeenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Twelfth Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence
Iterative Combinatorial Auctions: Theory and Practice
Proceedings of the Seventeenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Twelfth Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence
The Cocaine Auction Protocol: On the Power of Anonymous Broadcast
IH '99 Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Information Hiding
An Auction Protocol Which Hides Bids of Losers
PKC '00 Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptography: Public Key Cryptography
Towards a test‐bed for trading agents in electronic auction markets
AI Communications
Taming the computational complexity of combinatorial auctions: optimal and approximate approaches
IJCAI'99 Proceedings of the 16th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence - Volume 1
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In a multiple-object auction, every bidder tries to win as many objects as possible with a bidding algorithm. This paper studies position-randomized auctions, which form a special class of multiple-object auctions where a bidding algorithm consists of an initial bid sequence and an algorithm for randomly permuting the sequence. We are especially concerned with situations where some bidders know the bidding algorithms of others. For the case of only two bidders, we give an optimal bidding algorithm for the disadvantaged bidder. Our result generalizes previous work by allowing the bidders to have unequal budgets. One might naturally anticipate that the optimal expected numbers of objects won by the bidders would be proportional to their budgets. Surprisingly, this is not true. Our new algorithm runs in optimal O(n) time in a straightforward manner. The case with more than two bidders is open.