Computational geometry: algorithms and applications
Computational geometry: algorithms and applications
The Michigan Internet AuctionBot: a configurable auction server for human and software agents
AGENTS '98 Proceedings of the second international conference on Autonomous agents
Computationally Manageable Combinational Auctions
Management Science
eMediator: a next generation electronic commerce server
AGENTS '00 Proceedings of the fourth international conference on Autonomous agents
Competitive analysis of incentive compatible on-line auctions
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions
Artificial Intelligence
Winner determination in combinatorial auction generalizations
Proceedings of the first international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems: part 1
Taming the Computational Complexity of Combinatorial Auctions: Optimal and Approximate Approaches
IJCAI '99 Proceedings of the Sixteenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Solving Combinatorial Auctions Using Stochastic Local Search
Proceedings of the Seventeenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Twelfth Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence
An Algorithm for Multi-Unit Combinatorial Auctions
Proceedings of the Seventeenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Twelfth Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence
IJCAI'01 Proceedings of the 17th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
Online algorithms for market clearing
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
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Markets are important coordination mechanisms for multiagent systems, and market clearing has become a key application area of algorithms. We study optimal clearing in the ubiquitous setting where there are multiple indistinguishable units for sale. The sellers and buyers express their bids via supply and demand curves. Discriminatory pricing leads to greater profit for the party who runs the market than nondiscriminatory pricing. We show that this comes at the cost of computation complexity. For piecewise linear curves we present a fast polynomial-time algorithm for nondiscriminatory clearing, and show that discriminatory clearing is NP-complete (even in a very special case). We then show that in the more restricted setting of linear curves, even discriminatory markets can be cleared fast in polynomial time. Our derivations also uncover the elegant fact that to obtain the optimal discriminatory solution, each buyer's (seller's) price is incremented (decremented) equally from that agent's price in the quantity-unconstrained solution.