Numerical recipes in C: the art of scientific computing
Numerical recipes in C: the art of scientific computing
Differentially uniform mappings for cryptography
EUROCRYPT '93 Workshop on the theory and application of cryptographic techniques on Advances in cryptology
On the distribution of characteristics in bijective mappings
EUROCRYPT '93 Workshop on the theory and application of cryptographic techniques on Advances in cryptology
Linear cryptanalysis method for DES cipher
EUROCRYPT '93 Workshop on the theory and application of cryptographic techniques on Advances in cryptology
An experiment on DES statistical cryptanalysis
CCS '96 Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Avalanche Characteristics of Substitution-Permutation Encryption Networks
IEEE Transactions on Computers
Provable Security Against Differential Cryptanalysis
CRYPTO '92 Proceedings of the 12th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
x2 Cryptanalysis of the SEAL Encryption Algorithm
FSE '97 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Fast Software Encryption
Analysis and design of block ciphers
Analysis and design of block ciphers
Structured Design of Substitution-Permutation Encryption Networks
IEEE Transactions on Computers
Proceedings of the 1982 conference on Cryptography
Modeling Linear Characteristics of Substitution-Permutation Networks
SAC '99 Proceedings of the 6th Annual International Workshop on Selected Areas in Cryptography
Proving the security of AES substitution-permutation network
SAC'05 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Selected Areas in Cryptography
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This paper investigates some security properties of basic substitution-permutation encryption networks (SPNs) by studying the nonlinearity distribution and the XOR table distribution. Based on the idea that mixing small weak transformations results in a large strong cipher, we provide some evidence which shows that a basic SPN converges to a randomly generated s-box with the same dimensions as the SPN after enough number of rounds. We also present a new Differential-like attack which is easy to implement and outperforms the classical Differential cryptanalysis on the basic SPN structure. In particular, it is shown that 64-bit SPNs with 8 × 8 s-boxes are resistant to our attack after 12 rounds. All of above effort may be regarded as the first step towards provable security for SPN cryptosystems.