Learning to coordinate without sharing information
AAAI '94 Proceedings of the twelfth national conference on Artificial intelligence (vol. 1)
The dynamics of reinforcement learning in cooperative multiagent systems
AAAI '98/IAAI '98 Proceedings of the fifteenth national/tenth conference on Artificial intelligence/Innovative applications of artificial intelligence
Introduction to Reinforcement Learning
Introduction to Reinforcement Learning
Multiagent Reinforcement Learning: Theoretical Framework and an Algorithm
ICML '98 Proceedings of the Fifteenth International Conference on Machine Learning
Evaluating Concurrent Reinforcement Learners
ICMAS '00 Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference on MultiAgent Systems (ICMAS-2000)
Learning to coordinate actions in multi-agent systems
IJCAI'93 Proceedings of the 13th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence - Volume 1
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The multiagent learning literature has looked at iterated two-player games to develop mechanisms that allow agents to learn to converge on Nash Equilibrium strategy profiles. An equilibrium configuration implies that there is no motivation for one player to change its strategy if the other does not. Often, in general sum games, a higher payoff can be obtained by both players if one chooses not to respond optimally to the other player. By developing mutual trust, agents can avoid iterated best responses that will lead to a lesser payoff Nash Equilibrium. In this paper we consider 1-level agents (modelers) who select actions based on expected utility considering probability distributions over the actions of the opponent(s). We show that in certain situations, such stochastically-greedy agents can perform better (by developing mutually trusting behavior) than those that explicitly attempt to converge to Nash Equilibrium. We also experiment with an interesting action revealation strategy that can give the revealer better payoff on convergence than a non-revealing approach. By revealing, the revealer enables the opponent to agree to a more trusted equilibrium.