Key Recovery and Forgery Attacks on the MacDES MAC Algorithm

Authors:
Don Coppersmith;Lars R. Knudsen;Chris J. Mitchell
Affiliations:
-;-;-
Venue:
CRYPTO '00 Proceedings of the 20th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Year:
2000

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Abstract

We describe a series of new attacks on a CBC-MAC algorithm due to Knudsen and Preneel including two key recovery attacks and a forgery attack. Unlike previous attacks, these techniques will work when the MAC calculation involves prefixing the data to be MACed with a 'length block'. These attack methods provide new (tighter) upper bounds on the level of security offered by the MacDES technique.