An efficient probabilistic public key encryption scheme which hides all partial information
Proceedings of CRYPTO 84 on Advances in cryptology
Proceedings of CRYPTO 84 on Advances in cryptology
The knowledge complexity of interactive proof-systems
STOC '85 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Symmetric and Asymmetric Encryption
ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)
A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems
Communications of the ACM
Using encryption for authentication in large networks of computers
Communications of the ACM
Probabilistic encryption & how to play mental poker keeping secret all partial information
STOC '82 Proceedings of the fourteenth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
DIGITALIZED SIGNATURES AND PUBLIC-KEY FUNCTIONS AS INTRACTABLE AS FACTORIZATION
DIGITALIZED SIGNATURES AND PUBLIC-KEY FUNCTIONS AS INTRACTABLE AS FACTORIZATION
How to generate cryptographically strong sequences of pseudo random bits
SFCS '82 Proceedings of the 23rd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Why and how to establish a private code on a public network
SFCS '82 Proceedings of the 23rd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Theory and application of trapdoor functions
SFCS '82 Proceedings of the 23rd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
A private interactive test of a boolean predicate a minimum-knowledge public-key cryptosystems
SFCS '85 Proceedings of the 26th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
A "Paradoxical" Solution To The Signature Problem
SFCS '84 Proceedings of the 25th Annual Symposium onFoundations of Computer Science, 1984
RSA/Rabin Bits are 1/2 + 1 Poly (Log N) Secure
SFCS '84 Proceedings of the 25th Annual Symposium onFoundations of Computer Science, 1984
Proof of plaintext knowledge for the ajtai-dwork cryptosystem
TCC'05 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Theory of Cryptography
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
Public-key encryption would seem to be inherently assymmetrie, in that only messages sent to a user can be encrypted using his public key. We demonstrate that the use of interactive protocols for sending encrypted messages enables a symmetric use of public keys; we give cryptographic protocols for the following tasks: 1. Probabilistic encryption, using the same public key, both of messages that are sent to a particular user as well as of messages that the user sends to others, without compromising the key. We propose a public-key cryptosystem based on these protocols which has only one key, owned by a cryptographic server. 2. Authentication both of the sender and of the receiver of a probabilistically encrypted message. 3. Probabilistic encryption which is provably secure against both chosen-message and chosen-ciphertext attack.