Proceedings of CRYPTO 84 on Advances in cryptology
SFCS '78 Proceedings of the 19th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
An observation on the security of McEliece's public-key cryptosystem
Lecture Notes in Computer Science on Advances in Cryptology-EUROCRYPT'88
On the McEliece public-key cryptosystem
CRYPTO '88 Proceedings on Advances in cryptology
An implementation of the McEliece-cryptosystem
ACM SIGSAC Review
McEliece Public Key Cryptosystems Using Algebraic-Geometric Codes
Designs, Codes and Cryptography
Improving the Security of the McEliece Public-Key Cryptosystem
ASIACRYPT '98 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
Semantically Secure McEliece Public-Key Cryptosystems-Conversions for McEliece PKC
PKC '01 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptography: Public Key Cryptography
PKC '02 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptosystems: Public Key Cryptography
The Rao-Nam Scheme is Insecure Against a Chosen-Plaintext Attack
CRYPTO '87 A Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques on Advances in Cryptology
SPMH: a solution to the problem of malicious hosts
Journal of Computer Science and Technology
IEICE - Transactions on Information and Systems
Ideals over a non-commutative ring and their application in cryptology
EUROCRYPT'91 Proceedings of the 10th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Equivalent Goppa codes and trapdoors to McEliece's public key cryptosystem
EUROCRYPT'91 Proceedings of the 10th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Smaller decoding exponents: ball-collision decoding
CRYPTO'11 Proceedings of the 31st annual conference on Advances in cryptology
Quantum McEliece public-key cryptosystem
Quantum Information & Computation
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The optimal values for the parameters of the McEliece public key cryptosystem are computed. Using these values improves the cryptanalytic complexity of the system and decreases its data expansion. Secondly it is shown that the likelihood of the existence of more than one trapdoor in the system is very small.