The knowledge complexity of interactive proof-systems
STOC '85 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
The complexity of perfect zero-knowledge
STOC '87 Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Zero knowledge proofs of identity
STOC '87 Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Does co-NP have short interactive proofs?
Information Processing Letters
Multi-prover interactive proofs: how to remove intractability assumptions
STOC '88 Proceedings of the twentieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Witness indistinguishable and witness hiding protocols
STOC '90 Proceedings of the twenty-second annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Perfect zero-knowledge in constant rounds
STOC '90 Proceedings of the twenty-second annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Everything in NP can be Argued in Perfect Zero-Knowledge in a Bounded Number of Rounds
ICALP '89 Proceedings of the 16th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming
Proofs that yield nothing but their validity and a methodology of cryptographic protocol design
SFCS '86 Proceedings of the 27th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Two-prover one-round proof systems: their power and their problems (extended abstract)
STOC '92 Proceedings of the twenty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Two prover protocols: low error at affordable rates
STOC '94 Proceedings of the twenty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
STOC '95 Proceedings of the twenty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Low Communication 2-Prover Zero-Knowledge Proofs for NP
CRYPTO '92 Proceedings of the 12th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
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The model of zero knowledge multi prover interactive proofs was introduced by Ben-Or, Goldwasser, Kilian and Wigderson. A major open problem associated with these protocols is whether they can be executed in parallel. A positive answer was claimed by Fortnow, Rompel and Sipser, but its proof was later shown to be flawed by Fortnow who demonstrated that the probability of cheating in n independent parallel rounds can be exponentially higher than the probability of cheating in n independent sequential rounds. In this paper we use refined combinatorial arguments to settle this problem by proving that the probability of cheating in a parallelized BGKW protocol is at most 1/2n/9, and thus every problem in NP has a one-round two prover protocol which is perfectly zero knowledge under no cryptographic assumptions.