How to reduce your enemy's information
Lecture notes in computer sciences; 218 on Advances in cryptology---CRYPTO 85
Principles and practice of information theory
Principles and practice of information theory
Privacy amplification by public discussion
SIAM Journal on Computing - Special issue on cryptography
Experimental quantum cryptography
Journal of Cryptology - Eurocrypt '90
Conditionally-perfect secrecy and a provably-secure randomized cipher
Journal of Cryptology - Eurocrypt '90
Secret key agreement by public discussion from common information
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Key Distribution Protocol Based on Noisy Channel and Error Detecting Codes
MMM-ACNS '01 Proceedings of the International Workshop on Information Assurance in Computer Networks: Methods, Models, and Architectures for Network Security
Unconditional Security in Cryptography
Lectures on Data Security, Modern Cryptology in Theory and Practice, Summer School, Aarhus, Denmark, July 1998
The Search for the Holy Grail in Quantum Cryptography
Lectures on Data Security, Modern Cryptology in Theory and Practice, Summer School, Aarhus, Denmark, July 1998
A Practical Protocol for Advantage Distillation and Information Reconciliation
Designs, Codes and Cryptography
An Improved Robust Fuzzy Extractor
SCN '08 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Security and Cryptography for Networks
Non-malleable extractors and symmetric key cryptography from weak secrets
Proceedings of the forty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Information-theoretically secure secret-key agreement by NOT authenticated public discussion
EUROCRYPT'97 Proceedings of the 16th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Survey: leakage resilience and the bounded retrieval model
ICITS'09 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Information theoretic security
MMM-ACNS'12 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Mathematical Methods, Models and Architectures for Computer Network Security: computer network security
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Consider the following scenario: Alice and Bob, two parties who share no secret key initially but whose goal it is to generate a (large amount of) information-theoretically secure (or unconditionally secure) shared secret key, are connected only by an insecure public channel to which an eavesdropper Eve has perfect (read) access. Moreover, there exists a satelite broadcasting random bits at a very low signal power. Alice and Bob can receive these bits with certain bit error probabilities 驴A and 驴B, respectively (e.g. 驴A = 驴B = 30%) while Eve is assumed to receive the same bits much more reliably with bit error probability 驴E 驴 驴A, 驴B (e.g. 驴E = 1%). The errors on the three channels are assumed to occur at least partially independently. Practical protocols are discussed by which Alice and Bob can generate a secret key despite the facts that Eve possesses more information than both of them and is assumed to have unlimited computational resources as well as complete knowledge of the protocols.The described scenario is a special case of a much more general setup in which Alice, Bob and Eve are assumed to know random variables X, Y and Z jointly distributed according to some probability distribution PXYZ, respectively. The results of this paper suggest to build cryptographic systems that are provably secure against enemies with unlimited computing power under realistic assumptions about the partial independence of the noise on the involved communication channels.