Pseudorandomness and Cryptographic Applications
Pseudorandomness and Cryptographic Applications
Theory and application of trapdoor functions
SFCS '82 Proceedings of the 23rd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Security preserving amplification of hardness
SFCS '90 Proceedings of the 31st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Security-preserving hardness-amplification for any regular one-way function
STOC '99 Proceedings of the thirty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Folklore, practice and theory of robust combiners
Journal of Computer Security
Nearly one-sided tests and the Goldreich-Levin predicate
EUROCRYPT'03 Proceedings of the 22nd international conference on Theory and applications of cryptographic techniques
Saving private randomness in one-way functions and pseudorandom generators
TCC'08 Proceedings of the 5th conference on Theory of cryptography
On the power of the randomized iterate
CRYPTO'06 Proceedings of the 26th annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology
Pseudorandom generators with long stretch and low locality from random local one-way functions
STOC '12 Proceedings of the forty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
On the Power of the Randomized Iterate
SIAM Journal on Computing
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The main contribution of this paper is the introduction of a formal notion of public randomness in the context of cryptography. We show how this notion affects the definition of the security of a cryptographic primitive and the definition of how much security is preserved when one cryptographic primitive is reduced to another. Previous works considered the public random bits as a part of the input, and security was parameterized in terms of the total length of the input. We parameterize security solely in terms of the length of the private input, and treat the public random bits as a separate resource. This separation allows us to independently address the important issues of how much security is preserved by a reduction and how many public random bits are used in the reduction.To exemplify these new definitions, we present reductions from weak one-way permutations to one-way permutations with strong security preserving properties that are simpler than previously known reductions.