Verifying identity via keystroke characteristics
International Journal of Man-Machine Studies
Identity authentication based on keystroke latencies
Communications of the ACM
Computer-Access Security Systems Using Keystroke Dynamics
IEEE Transactions on Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence
User identification via keystroke characteristics of typed names using neural networks
International Journal of Man-Machine Studies
Keystroke dynamics as a biometric for authentication
Future Generation Computer Systems - Special issue on security on the Web
“Pressure sequence”- a novel method of protecting smart cards
Proceedings of the fourth working conference on smart card research and advanced applications on Smart card research and advanced applications
Biometrics, access control, smart cards: a not so simple combination
Proceedings of the fourth working conference on smart card research and advanced applications on Smart card research and advanced applications
Biometrics, Personal Identification in Networked Society: Personal Identification in Networked Society
Verification of computer users using keystroke dynamics
IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Part B: Cybernetics
Computer user verification using login string keystroke dynamics
IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Part A: Systems and Humans
GhostDB: querying visible and hidden data without leaks
Proceedings of the 2007 ACM SIGMOD international conference on Management of data
Dynamic access-control policies on XML encrypted data
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Distributed and Parallel Databases
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With the growing number of smartcard applications there comes an increasing need to restrict access to the card itself. In previous work we proposed the pressure sequence biometric, within which a biometric sensor is integrated onto the card in a low-cost and mechanically compliant manner. Using an off-card verifier we demonstrated reasonable discrimination between users. In this paper we consider a number of on-card verification schemes, the best of which offers an equal error rate of 2.3%. On-card computational time requirements were found to be 3.1 seconds for enrolment and 0.12 seconds for verification. Incorporating our implementation into an existing applet used 684 bytes of program space. Whilst data memory requirements are estimated to be 1400 and 300 bytes for enrolment and verification, respectively. These time and size requirements demonstrate our biometric as a practical proposition for the protection of smart cards. Experiments were performed with the iButton's Java Card platform.