Forming coalitions in the face of uncertain rewards
AAAI '94 Proceedings of the twelfth national conference on Artificial intelligence (vol. 1)
Coalition, cryptography, and stability: mechanisms for coalition formation in task oriented domains
AAAI '94 Proceedings of the twelfth national conference on Artificial intelligence (vol. 1)
Exploiting Social Reasioning to Enhance Adaption in Open-Multi-Agent Systems
SBIA '95 Proceedings of the 12th Brazilian Symposium on Artificial Intelligence: Advances in Artificial Intelligence
The Contract Net Protocol: High-Level Communication and Control in a Distributed Problem Solver
IEEE Transactions on Computers
A transitive dependence based social reasoning mechanism for coalition formation
IDEAL'05 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Intelligent Data Engineering and Automated Learning
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We present a utility-driven rationality and a complementary-driven rationality based model, relative to multiple partner coalitions, motivated by relations of dependence and instrumental goal adoption. For this purpose, we analyze social dependency patterns and its corresponding dependency networks. The networks are used as a source of quantitative and qualitative information with which an agent is able to choose the best set of partners and adequate proposals to form coalitions. An e-commerce example is presented, showing the usefulness of the mechanism in real world multi-agent systems.