Analysis of the GHS Weil Descent Attack on the ECDLP over Characteristic Two Finite Fields of Composite Degree

Authors:
Markus Maurer;Alfred Menezes;Edlyn Teske
Affiliations:
-;-;-
Venue:
INDOCRYPT '01 Proceedings of the Second International Conference on Cryptology in India: Progress in Cryptology
Year:
2001

Citing 2
Cited 4

A remark concerning m-divisibility and the discrete logarithm in the divisor class group of curves

Mathematics of Computation
KANT V4

Journal of Symbolic Computation - Special issue on computational algebra and number theory: proceedings of the first MAGMA conference

Efficient Multiplication Beyond Optimal Normal Bases

IEEE Transactions on Computers
Fast Normal Basis Multiplication Using General Purpose Processors

IEEE Transactions on Computers
Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems in the Presence of Permanent and Transient Faults

Designs, Codes and Cryptography
The GHS attack revisited

EUROCRYPT'03 Proceedings of the 22nd international conference on Theory and applications of cryptographic techniques

Quantified Score

Hi-index	0.01

Visualization

Abstract

We analyze the Gaudry-Hess-Smart (GHS) Weil descent attack on the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP) for elliptic curves defined over characteristic two finite fields of composite extension degree. For each such field F2N, N 驴 [160, 600], we identify elliptic curve parameters such that (i) there should exist a cryptographically interesting elliptic curve E over F2N with these parameters; and (ii) the GHS attack is more efficient for solving the ECDLP in E(F2N) than for any other cryptographically interesting elliptic curve over F2N.